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ABSTRACT
The rhetoric of postmodernism is dense, difficult, and widely interpreted.  It is this 
abrasive and ambiguous nature that has often led to many of postmodern discourse’s more 
beneficial aspects being either overlooked or disregarded.  In this thesis, I have clarified some of 
the discourse’s more complex aspects, addressed its opponents, and highlighted its strongest 
points, and in doing this, I have shown the various uses for postmodern rhetoric as per practical 
application. Citing both postmodern and modern scholars, I have argued, ultimately, for 
postmodern rhetoric’s implementation and fusion with the modernist rhetoric that so dominates 
our Western democratic sphere.  I have chosen to examine two specific areas that I believe to be 
the most formative and influential in constructing our ideas of what it means to be a thoughtful, 
productive American citizen: education and public administration.  I specifically analyze the 
pedagogical “tools” postmodern discourse has to offer and argue for its inclusion and 
implementation, not only in the University classroom, but also in classrooms all across America, 
to students of all ages and educational levels. In the chapter on postmodern politics, I maintain 
that our public administrators, policy-makers, and politicians all would benefit greatly by 
acknowledging and understanding the rhetoric of postmodernism and incorporating it into our 
contemporary political sphere.
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INTRODUCTION
When Francis Fukuyama, in his polemical text on the state of politics of the Western 
world, declared the establishment of the capitalist, liberal democracy as “the end of history,” he 
was not without his detractors (1).  Some pointed to the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the first 
Gulf War as undeniable, marked points of humankind’s history. Though these were undoubtedly 
noteworthy events of our collective history, Fukuyama was not suggesting they and others like 
them would cease to occur.  Rather, he was suggesting the current socio-political landscape, at 
least that of Western liberal democracies, had reached a definitive end due to what he perceived 
to be an inability to progress beyond the justice and proficiency produced by societies operating 
under the economic model of late capitalism.1  Depending on how one views the effectiveness or 
fairness of Western capitalistic societies, this may seem to be a frightening conclusion indeed.  
However, if some are alarmed by Fukuyama’s assessment that the world politic has idled, then 
they may seek solace in one Western establishment that is constantly changing, one that can 
perhaps resuscitate this stagnancy of social progress resulting from such a fixed system, and that 
is the protean institution of Academia.  
Since its inception, the University system has seen its curriculum and its importance as a 
knowledge producing institution change at varying rates.  Often times, the University would find 
that its sound, established pedagogy had come under fire by newer, more radical ideas in fields 
such as philosophy, psychology, or the hard sciences2.  And the past four decades—an era of 
expedited and unprecedented change—have been no different thanks to the initiation of the fairly 
inchoate branch of philosophy known as postmodernism.  
                                                
1 Fukuyama declared in a follow-up article to The End of History and the Last Man, “[his] assertion that we have 
reached the ‘end of history’ is not a statement about the empirical condition of the world, but a normative argument 
concerning the justice or adequacy of liberal democratic political institution” (27).
2 By “hard” sciences, I mean to refer to empirical sciences such as biology, physics, or chemistry. 
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Introduced in the mid-sixties on the back of groundbreaking post-structuralist linguistics, 
postmodern discourse was met with a guarded acceptance. The carefully reasoned objectivity of 
the modernist era—which had hitherto been the bailiwick of academic thought—was severely 
questioned, as the one goal of postmodern philosophy (according to some) appeared to be the 
discrediting of the modernist project.  Postmodernism’s practitioners were regularly branded as 
nihilists seeking to disrupt centuries of “credible” and “scientific” “knowledge.”  
Despite the initial reluctance of “modernist” university disciplines to acknowledge this 
remarkable new method of thought, postmodern discourse would slowly permeate the academic 
arena and arise most noticeably in the University’s humanities departments.  The writings of 
Foucault, Derrida, and Lyotard would become standard texts in evaluating language, culture, and 
history and their effect on the human subject.  Through this rhetorical lens, Western intellectuals 
have been forced to reexamine practically every branch of knowledge as the disciplines of 
philosophy, psychology, science, anthropology, linguistics, history, and law, among others, all 
would scramble to reevaluate a now less than certain methodology.  
Postmodernism has certainly changed the face of academia, but the question “did anyone 
else take notice?” still remains.  The abrasive philosophy, however popular in intellectual circles, 
has for the most part failed to exist beyond the halls of the University.  Because of its esoteric 
beginnings, ambiguity, limited circulation, and other reasons I shall cite, postmodern discourse—
a crucial adjunct of and supplement to modernist discourse—has failed to gain acceptance (or in 
many cases even be acknowledged) by a mass audience.  Some critics, whom I will discuss later, 
have gone as far as to completely disregard postmodernism’s influence, maintaining that it is a 
barrier to “real” progress, and its nihilistic stance offers no real means for praxis.  It is here that I 
would like to begin the discussion, as these are the typical refutations any card-carrying 
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postmodern rhetorician must be equipped to combat if there is to be any revival.  So I ask, “What 
is the value of postmodern discourse, especially in relation to modernist discourse? Does it exist 
today beyond the realm of academia? And if not, where could it?  Or better perhaps, how could 
it?”  But before I can begin to answer these questions, it is important to examine the various 
features involved in this complex undertaking.  
Statement of Purpose
In this essay, through examining the rhetoric of both modernist and postmodern 
discourses in two specific fields—education and public administration—I will argue that 
adopting and enacting a postmodern ideological position, as a supplement to a modernist view, 
has several advantages.  I maintain that there are many valuable features—which I will examine 
in detail—involved in the rhetoric of postmodern theory/philosophy (absent from modernist 
discourses) that remain to be acknowledged, addressed, and, ultimately, implemented.  It is my 
hope that these features will be given the careful attention they deserve, a consideration that 
would undoubtedly lead to their implementation.  Such an action, I argue, would be invaluable to 
teachers and public administrators when addressing and trying to come to terms with the 
seemingly intractable social differences that directly lead to problems such as racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and many other intolerances, which only later emerge as political conflict and, 
subsequently, violence and war.   
Because there remains so much dissension as to what postmodern might mean, in the 
opening chapter, I first intend to examine the various rhetorical positions surrounding the very 
idea of “what is the postmodern?”  In the following section of the essay, I will analyze the 
rhetoric of postmodernism’s modernist opponents, in their varied incarnations, and the final 
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section will be devoted specifically to examining the rhetoric of modern and postmodern 
approaches in the previously mentioned fields of education and public administration.  In doing 
so, I will point to the failings of adhering to strictly modernist rhetoric in these specific settings, 
and show where postmodern discourse just might be able to strengthen and build upon what 
modernism has gained.  To do this, I will explore the pedagogical theories of Stanley Aronowitz 
and Stephen Giroux, from their seminal book, Postmodern Education, as well as other more 
recent educational theorists to examine the ways in which the modernist rhetoric of traditional 
pedagogy might be refashioned with postmodern discourse, for use in all levels of education.  
Following this, I will highlight the modernist-laden rhetoric of public administration and will 
then suggest how certain postmodern rhetorical moves could be more useful in the political 
discursive sphere, after which I will make concluding remarks. 
WHOSE POSTMODERNISM?
To better understand the discourse of postmodern theory, it is necessary to examine just 
what is meant when the term postmodern is used.  This remains a formidable task, however, as 
Ihab Hassan notes: “Like all categorical terms—post-structuralism, modernism, and even 
romanticism, for that matter—postmodernism suffers from a semantic instability: that is, no clear 
consensus about its meaning exists among scholars” (588).  This unclear consensus should not be 
discouraging, but encouraging rather, as it points to the openness and variety of postmodern 
discourse.  This is important because, as I will argue later, postmodern discourse, instead of 
being seen as quite varied, is often reduced and limited by the rhetoric of its opponents.
 As the base “modern” would suggest, postmodernism—in all its forms: philosophy, art, 
architecture, music, dance—is inextricably linked to modernism.  It is defined both by and 
against the tenets of its precursor.  It is in reference to this idea that Hassan comments, 
“postmodernism sounds not only awkward, uncouth; it evokes what it wishes to pass or suppress, 
modernism itself. The term thus contains the enemy within” (588).  This, however, is a reduction 
we could probably do without.  So often, the very prefix “post” marks a superiority that isn’t 
always warranted.  This can have various effects.  Most often, defensive posturing against 
postmodern discourse occurs, and hope of any real examination is lost.  
It is also important to note that postmodernism “requires both historical and theoretical 
definition” (Hassan 589).  This, however, should not imply that the two are mutually exclusive; 
quite to the contrary, the rhetoric of postmodernity (“historical”) and postmodernism 
(“theoretical”) regularly intersect.  As for the first reference, many would  agree that we are 
amidst a postmodern era now and cite globalization, advancements in medicine and technology, 
the Internet, cyberspace, virtual reality, mass communication and information, and other 
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contemporary features as proper justification.  However, the high-tech gadgetry of a specific era 
cannot alone justify its nomenclature, so one must look deeper to discern the very point where 
the two dimensions meet.  
Postmodernity as an era can also refer to a specific time and place when and where the 
discourse (the theoretical side) of postmodernism occurs.  And this postmodern discourse, if one 
must proffer a date, began most concretely in the 1960s.3  The dense, highly technical, 
philosophical prose used by the small group of French intellectuals (some of whom I named 
before) writing in the late 60s and 70s would first establish the postmodern discourse 
community.  However, the rhetorical verbiage that would best exhibit the postmodern mindset 
(and come to serve as a battle cry for the postmodern movement) is offered in Jean-Francois 
Lyotard’s monumental A Report on Knowledge: the Postmodern Condition, published in 1979.  
In this text, Lyotard maintained that the postmodern condition is “marked by incredulity toward 
the metanarrative” (3).  This single phrase, restated, reprinted, and repeated ad infinitum, would 
take postmodern discourse to a new level, and during the 1980s, “postmodern doubt” became a 
full-blown topos for the American intellectual community.  The term, topos, I borrow from 
rhetorician Rosa Eberly’s book Citizen Critics.  In this work she states that topoi are “recurring 
inventional structures […], [which are] concerned with the production—invention and 
judgment—of discourses” (4-5).  It is in this sense that I mean to suggest this brilliant 
                                                
3 Most scholars are reluctant to give a specific date as to when the postmodern movement began.  Ihab Hassan has 
pointed to instances of the word “postmodern” being used as early as 1934 when it was offered as 
“postmodernismo”  by Fedrico de Onis in his antologia de la poesia espanola e hispanoamericana (Hassan 587).  
He also tracks its progression throughout the 20th century noting several other usages and variations.  However, for 
my purposes here, I have chosen to examine the era in which I believe postmodern discourse has had the greatest 
impact: the period beginning in the 1960’s up until the present.
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reduction—“incredulity toward the metanarrative”—would become a point of departure for 
much of the discourse surrounding postmodernism.  
Throughout the past twenty years, the rhetoric surrounding the word “incredulity,” alone, 
has been quite different for those who stand against postmodern discourse and for those who 
stand with it.  Its opponents have reduced the term consistently to imply first “disbelief,” then 
perhaps “unbelief,” and then ultimately, nothing other than sheer nihilism.  However, just as 
soon as postmodern opponents began to reduce and negate what this Lyotardian trope might 
mean, postmodern proponents co-opted the phrase as well, and added their own rhetorical spin. 
Nicholas Burbeles’ explanation of the phrase offers an example: 
Postmodernism seems to be about denying the possibility of these 
[metanarratives], and rejecting as monolithic and hegemonic the ones that 
Western traditions have embraced. But the key term in this phrase (in translation, 
at least) is “incredulity”—a fascinating and unexpected word. Incredulity is not 
denial or rejection or refutation; it is an inability to believe. In this difference I 
think we see what is most distinctive and penetrating in the postmodern insight. 
(par. 5)  
This idea of ambivalence towards, rather than an all out rejection or refutation of specific 
metanarritives, is for the most part, a better summarization of what is meant by the phrase 
“postmodern doubt.”  It is rhetoric like this that more accurately portrays what postmodern 
discourse is about, a rhetorical positioning that makes the seemingly abrasive discourse appear 
more appealing to teachers and public administrators, who might hope to implement such 
strategies in either the classroom or the political arena. 
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However, despite the prominence of the postmodern conversation in the university and 
small intellectual circles, we now find ourselves well into the 21st century, and the typical K-12 
educators and public administrators are none the wiser.  This minimal circulation again begs the 
question, “Why has postmodern discourse not caught on?”  But before beginning to answer such 
a question, it might be best to examine the rhetoric of those opposed to it.
POSTMODERN OPPOSITION
For those within the current postmodern discourse community, the entire gamut—from 
dogmatic acceptance to outright disavowal—is in play.  This wide array of postmodern thinkers 
remains, as expected, divided on several issues regarding the usefulness of postmodern rhetoric.  
Certain progressive postmodern thinkers, who do acknowledge the deconstructive value of 
postmodern discourse, yet see some of the more rigid tenets as counterproductive, tend to prefer 
the discourse of a watered down or almost quasi-metaphysical postmodernism exhibited by such 
pragmatic thinkers as Richard Rorty. There are others, such as Jean Baudrillard, who strictly 
follow the deconstructive nature of postmodernism and warn against any true application for the 
theory.  However, it is not these thinkers that I wish to address, but the rather large constituency 
of modernist rhetoricians, philosophers, intellectuals, and academics (from both the left and
right), who, in firmly confiding in the modernist rhetoric of reasoned, scientific inquiry, fail to
see the deleterious effects caused by the continual production of modernist rhetorical 
constructions based on the notions of progress and empiricism.
When Alan Sokal, a full time physicist and part time cultural critic, published his now-
infamous hoax article in the cultural studies journal Social Text, he wittingly unleashed a 
maelstrom of academic commentary on the state of postmodern affairs.  His attempts to 
undermine postmodernism and point out the inherent fallibility in engaging in such a falsified,
“lazy” critique would at first seemed to have dealt a crushing blow to postmodern proponents.  
However, Stanley Fish, with much at stake in the issue, [he was “executive director of the Duke 
University Press, which publishes the journal Social Text” (par. 31)] would argue that Sokal’s 
assertions were unfounded in his rebuttal published in the New York Times shortly after the hoax 
10
was uncovered.  He discounted Sokal’s underlying claim that postmodernism had rendered 
science a mere “social construction” with that matter-of-factness so characteristic of Fish:
What sociologists of science say is that of course the world is real and 
independent of our observations but that accounts of the world are produced by 
observers and are therefore relative to their capacities, education, training, etc. It 
is not the world or its properties but the vocabularies in whose terms we know 
them that are socially constructed—fashioned by human beings—which is why 
our understanding of those properties is continually changing. (par. 4)
Fish’s article tersely and cogently declared what some postmodern supporters seemed to have 
been saying all along: that postmodern discourse is in no way trying to usurp the purported laws
of scientific evaluation, but more, postmodern critiques of the sciences are created in an effort to 
evaluate the intersection of social politics and scientific methodology from a less objectified 
position so as to destabilize some of the more erroneous claims (such as those of the recently 
resigned president of Harvard, Lawrence Summers) made possible by racist, sexist, and overall 
hegemonic scientific research.  This in no way should have seemed like a threat to those in 
Sokal’s field who rely on the objective standards of scientific reality in order to, say, shoot a 
rocket into outer space; however, it should serve as a wakeup call to those in his field who fail to 
see the distinction between sending a shuttle into the great beyond and our very human and 
emotional responses to such an event.  Nonetheless, Sokal’s hoax did serve as a call to arms for 
all those who rallied behind him, namely, leftist humanists, who view postmodern rhetoric as a 
direct threat to scientific progress, and conservative ideologues, who view postmodernism as 
nihilistic, academic hokum.
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One adamant supporter of Sokal from the left, Barbara Epstein, divides postmodern 
discourse into two branches: a strong and weak postmodernism.  This strong version of 
postmodernism “tends to take the form of an extreme social constructionism, a view that 
identities, relations, [sic] political positions are constructed entirely through interpretation, that 
there is no identifiable social reality against which interpretations can be judged, no ground in 
material or social reality that places any constraints on the formation of identities or 
perspectives” (par. 29).  What seems curious is that Epstein, in her diatribe against postmodern 
discourse, does not dismiss these methods so much as the people who practice them, or the group 
whom she refers to as the “postmodern subculture” (par. 40).  Epstein contends, “there is an 
intense ingroupyness, a concern with who is in and who is out, and an obscurantist vocabulary 
whose main function often seems to be to mark those on the inside and allow them to feel that 
they are part of an intellectual elite” (par. 40).  Epstein’s putative claim that postmodern 
discourse is only for the “elite” fails to acknowledge why postmodern discourse is so difficult.  
Here, it must be noted that the language of postmodernism originated from various European 
philosophical discourses (specifically Greek, German, and French) and was generated by mostly 
French writers, who, in compiling such philosophical jargon, coined much of postmodernism’s 
terminology.  The translation (yet another degree of separation) of these highly sophisticated 
concepts, which were being used by postmodern rhetoricians in never-before-imagined ways, 
only obfuscated and alienated many who attempted to comprehend the intimidating discourse.  It 
is because of this, and not through any intentions of its advocates, that postmodern discourse is 
often deemed abstruse and recondite.  However, that is not to suggest it is inaccessible.  Much to 
the contrary, postmodern discourse’s slow infiltration is a sign that it can be acknowledged, 
comprehended, and instated if only modernist rhetoricians would explore the rhetoric of 
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postmodernism more thoroughly and carefully, rather than dismiss it altogether with faulty logic 
and erroneous claims.
So rather than flatly denying any practical uses for postmodernism and aiming her 
critique at “self-righteous” postmodernists, who are “cooler-than-thou” (par. 39), Epstein dodges 
the real question entirely because, when pressed, modernists like herself are unable to refute the 
brand of postmodernism that could be most beneficial: the one she refers to as weak
postmodernism.  In fact, Epstein explicitly states that the “weak, or restrained, version of 
postmodernism […] is much more plausible than the strong version described above. This 
version argues that language and culture play a major and often unrecognized role in shaping 
society, that things are often regarded as natural which are actually socially constructed. This is a 
valid and important perspective” (par. 32).  The phrase, “this is a valid and important 
perspective,” hardly sounds like an attack against postmodern application.  It is rather an 
acknowledgement of the many benefits that could arise from postmodernism’s implementation, 
especially regarding things that seem natural as socially constructed.
Epstein continues to weaken her argument against postmodernism, suggesting, “we 
would argue that although we do not possess ultimate truth and never will, it is nevertheless 
possible to expand our understanding, and it is worth the effort to gain more knowledge—even if 
that knowledge is always subject to revision” (par. 28).  Exactly!  Is this not what postmodern 
rhetoric has been asserting all along? That we can get closer to the truth, or at least that which 
represents the truth in our day-to-day lives, through postmodern methods of multiplicity, active 
interrogation, and scrupulous re-evaluation?  
Epstein, however, does not rest there, and her most erroneous claim comes at the end of 
her essay where she avers, “No doubt, one reason that postmodernism has taken hold so widely 
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is that it is much easier to be critical than to present a positive vision” (par 55).  Certainly this 
may be true, but since when was a “positive vision” absent from postmodern discourse?  This 
assertion—which has been ongoing in the postmodernism/modernism debate since the early 
80’s—is not only blatantly false but also an affront to the inordinate number of anti-
foundationalists (Michael Berube comes to mind) who are quite dedicated to uncovering the 
ways (that I will address in the following chapters) in which the rhetoric of postmodernism might 
benefit contemporary society. 
What Epstein seems to miss, as do so many others, is that postmodern discourse—weak 
or strong—just by being acknowledged has for the most part already accomplished its task.  The 
debate should not be about who is able to most eloquently support their claims for 
antifoundationalism, through word-play, connivance, or mobius strip self-referentiality, but in 
understanding that it has already found a chink in the armor of modernist thought, one that 
Epstein rightly acknowledges: that our ideological positions, actions, and differences—all once 
believed to be natural—are now viewed as constructions. 
 It is through this gaping aperture that postmodernism must insert its rhetorical practices 
and methods so as to reconfigure the modernist discourse that dominates practically every 
discursive sphere.  It may be that in order for modernist discourse and scientific rationality to 
again flourish, they need to be refashioned with what postmodern discourse has given us: that is, 
a more discerning view of truth to the point where we must not so much wrench these truths for 
their validity from relative perspectives, but examine just how the Truth, or truths, or even 
falsehoods are enacted and incorporated into our mainstream ideology and our lives.  And if this 
is done carefully, citizens will then (1) encounter more open, less reductive ideas from which to 
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choose and incorporate into their own narratives, and (2) gain the peace in knowing that these 
ideas were arrived at through active interrogation and not passive and tacit infiltration. 
POSTMODERN PEDAGOGY
Modernist rhetoric, throughout the past century, has had enormous and, until recently, 
unchallenged success.  And while the discourse’s prominence is related mostly to its ties with the 
institution of education (most often the university) where it is propagated and legitimized, it is 
also here in this seat of academia, where a discourse of dissent has arisen.  Yet that discourse, as 
I have stated, does not appear to be trickling down to lower educational levels.  For this reason, a 
closer look at the rhetoric of traditional pedagogy is warranted.  This closer look should not only 
reveal the shortcomings of modernist discourse, but also highlight the need for a postmodern
rhetorical approach.  What I am suggesting is that it is the task of teachers to meticulously 
evaluate their own discourse and include postmodern rhetorical approaches directly within their 
teaching methods.  
I do clearly understand the implementation of postmodern discourse into pedagogy to be 
a difficult exercise—one that Stanley Fish argues is downright impossible.  In his essay, 
“Postmodern Warfare: The Ignorance of our Warrior Intellectuals,” he maintains, 
“Postmodernism is a series of arguments, not a way of life or a recipe for action” (33).  In 
contesting the ability to implement such a theoretical approach, Fish ultimately reduces 
postmodern discourse to an argumentative strategy rather than a practical tool.  However, many 
others argue that postmodernism can provide “a recipe for action.”  Perhaps the most celebrated 
postmodernist of all, who dedicated much of his life to re-writing and re-interpreting the 
objectified history of the West, Michel Foucault, certainly thought so.  Of his oeuvre, Foucault 
maintains: 
I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage 
through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area.  I 
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would like the little volume that I want to write on disciplinary systems to be 
useful to an educator, a warden, a magistrate, a conscientious objector. I don't 
write for an audience, I write for users, not readers.  (“Prisons”)
Two such “users,” Stanley Aronowitz and Steven Giroux, put this to the test as they 
argue consistently throughout Postmodern Education that a postmodern discourse can provide 
useful, practical insights for educational, instructional, and pedagogical techniques.  Their book, 
while promoting postmodern rhetorical approaches, is also scrupulous enough to keep in mind 
the objections, like those of Barbara Epstein, which maintain that the “postmodern subculture” is 
often too elite, obscurantist, and inaccessible.  Aronowitz and Giroux understand and
acknowledge this rather common protestation and suggest it is the mission of teachers to filter 
out these notions of obscurity and inaccessibility and provide students with a genuine 
understanding of postmodern rhetoric’s antifoundational approaches.  They state affirmatively, 
“the challenge, in our view, is to combine the intellectual work of cultural reclamation with the 
work of pedagogy.  This would entail a deliberate effort to avoid the tendency toward exclusivity 
on the part of intellectuals” (34).  The result of this postmodern/pedagogy synthesis, as 
suggested, is that the dense, esoteric jargon of postmodernism would not discourage the novice 
readers of primary, elementary, and high schools (and even undergraduate institutions).  This 
would be left to the educators, who would then only deliver what lies at the center of postmodern 
discourse: that certain narratives, which often masquerade as truth, are arbitrary, in the sense that 
they are mainstream, popular, or (perhaps the most harmfully objective) “standard” for reasons 
not tied to internal essence or objectivity but constructed as such with the ideological scaffolding 
of a given cultural/linguistic/social system.  What has to happen in order for postmodern rhetoric 
to make its way into the classroom is that our educators must be able to handle and properly 
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disseminate the admittedly difficult ideas of post-structuralist linguistics and postmodern 
rhetoric/language evaluation.  And this can only be accomplished by thoroughly reevaluating just 
how and what is being taught to teachers, especially teachers of English.    
The Postmodern Classroom
Much of what is taught to school age children—dates, facts, scientific processes—falls 
under the guise of “knowledge” (and undisputable, legitimate knowledge at that).  However, 
what students often miss in their consumption of such facts (and what postmodern rhetoric might 
illuminate) are the power structures and contingent values which regularly influence what 
constitutes such knowledge.  Referring to this process, one critic, Clive Beck, asserts, “The 
learning of isolated facts and skills can be equally boring and meaningless. It is often through the 
drawing of broader connections between phenomena and the exploration of their value 
implications that learning comes alive” (par. 40).  Jon Stewart’s satirical textbook, America, 
rather humorously addresses this very idea of the “knowledge” students are gaining in the 
classroom.  In the margin of one of the pages, reminiscent of a classic high school textbook 
layout, there appears a “Were You Aware?” information box pertaining to the Magna Carta.  
Inscribed within is the blurb, “The fact that the Magna Carta was written in 1215 is, by law, the 
only thing you are required to know about it” (2).  Stewart’s humorous rhetoric is pointing out 
the ridiculousness of what constitutes knowledge taught to our school-aged children.  One of the 
most influential documents in Western history, which arguably is the basis for the U.S. 
constitution, is noteworthy not for this, but because its birth year offers an arbitrary figure, 1215, 
with which countless 10th grade world history teachers are able to measure the breadth of their 
students intellect.  
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Because internalization of arbitrary facts and figures is one of the means with which 
students’ abilities are measured, why not offer students more fields, ones they might have a 
greater interest in, from which to study?  Aronowitz and Giroux suggest that instead of relying so 
heavily on, as modernist rhetoric claims, the great canon of western education, teachers should 
include a sort of pastiche-style pedagogy, one that offers students a variety of discourses and a 
multiplicity of “knowledges.”  They suggest, “[Let us] start, not from the new great texts, much 
less from the old great texts, but from the texts of the vernacular experience: from popular
culture, not only in its visual form but in its visual artifacts as well” (35, emphasis mine).  
“Popular culture” offers an excellent point of departure for students’ evaluations because what 
makes certain cultural artifacts popular is a contemporary process of constant reinvention
influenced by the various people within a specific culture.  Exploring what is “popular” and how 
that comes about would be a crucial way for students to understand the processes of 
legitimization that so often take place.  The crucial difference, however, with this technique is 
that students would be examining something immediate.  Thus, by seeing the more local and 
specific processes occurring every day right in front of them, which serve to legitimize specific 
artifacts, students would then be able to make the “broader connections” between what is going 
on now in contemporary culture and what has been going on throughout history steering us 
towards where we now stand.
The teaching of popular culture in the classroom is certainly one alternative, yet this 
should also be a space where students can learn about the culture of those outside the Western 
tradition.  One place this type of pastiche-style pedagogy could be most easily implemented is in 
English and Literature classes where students, through teacher initiatives, could be able to see the 
various cultural artifacts outside of traditional reading requirements.  While post-colonial 
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literature courses have sprung up all through academia in the past fifteen years, students in high 
school settings have rarely, if ever, picked up the fiction of Salman Rushdie or Ngugi wa 
Thiongo, much less any literature of American Indians and rarely even African-American 
writers, save during that one special month of February.  
Because some opponents might view this as an example of “liberal” teachers practicing 
reverse discrimination against the Western tradition, it might be better to reconfigure our usual 
thinking of the traditional Platonic (read modernist) teacher-pupil structuring altogether.  In his 
article concerning the implication of postmodern methods in pedagogy, Clive Beck is correct to 
point out the rather hegemonic experience of teachers disseminating knowledge to their students.  
He maintains,
We must think increasingly in terms of “teachers and students learning together,” 
rather than the one telling the other how to live in a “top-down” manner. This is 
necessary both so that the values and interests of students are taken into account, 
and so that the wealth of their everyday experience is made available to fellow 
students and to the teacher.  (par. 41)
One way this might be accomplished is by allowing students to have a say in constructing their 
own course syllabi.  The students, themselves, could choose what readings would be assigned 
from a “bank” of widely represented cultural artifacts.  This would then provide an excellent 
opportunity (even if works were chosen from the same narrow paths) for teachers and students to 
begin a postmodern dialogue concerning not only the texts themselves, but also why specific 
texts were chosen and what that says about “value”: how it is firmly assigned, yet contingent 
upon a variety of social, ethnic, and cultural factors operating all around them, including their 
very classroom.  A close examination of the rhetorical processes of production, dissemination, 
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and circulation is a method of postmodern discourse that would allow students to see how value 
becomes attached to not only works of art, but also to various races, sexes, social classes, 
cultures, and religions.
The rise of the Internet and its ability to provide boundless information has led to an 
increasing number of “student directed” or “independent learning” schools, where students are 
directly shaping what they learn, by researching subjects of their own choosing independently.  
These schools, which foster the active educational experience, are also the perfect space to 
implement a postmodern rhetorical pedagogy—one that could teach students to understand the 
significance (which modernist discourse fails to do) of the Foucaldian connection between 
knowledge and power. Such a method of student-directed teaching can allow students to assign 
their own value to their own self-accumulated “knowledge.”  However, a useful supplement to 
this strategy would be a teacher-directed postmodern dialogue concerning the ways in which 
value becomes assigned to specific types of knowledge by various apparatuses like the media 
and the University or by specific cultures, groups, and religions.  If students were able to see that 
value is a relational, relative, and contextual construction, then they might be able to see that, in 
effect, all forms of knowledge can be said to have “value,” and therefore dogmatically attaching 
oneself to one specific knowledge or narrative is counterproductive to mediating our numerous 
social, cultural and political differences.  
Again, this in no way should be viewed as an outright disavowal of modernist 
methodology, just that modernist discourse, if it still must exist (and it certainly seems to be 
sticking around), has much to learn from its postmodern progeny—and vice-versa.  As 
Aronowitz and Giroux maintain, much of what has been gained from modernist interrogation is
still valuable, only it must be made aware of the postmodern conditions in which it exists—
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“those ideas of the project of modernity that link memory, agency, and reason to the construction 
of a democratic public sphere need to be defended as part of a discourse of critical pedagogy 
within (rather than in opposition to) the existing conditions of a postmodern world” (59, 
emphasis mine).   
So why not implement postmodern rhetorical methods with school age children?  Can our 
history books not also contain chapters on theories of history?  On how as Harold Bloland 
articulates, “[in postmodern discourse] overarching is the notion that history is not a smooth, 
rational, progressive unfolding of events but a series of ruptures and fragmented disjunctures” 
(124).  If educators were able to add such postmodern twists to their already modernist 
pedagogical arsenal then students would begin to see the variety of knowledge postmodern 
discourse offers.  And certainly this could lead to students celebrating these nascent and 
peripheral cultural formations along side more standardized cultural forms, which would then 
benefit both marginalized students who would certainly feel a new sense of empowerment and 
representation and majority students who would gain a new awareness from such diversifying 
and humanizing measures.  It must be noted that the continual perpetuation of modernist 
discourse and unchallenged acceptance of certain mythologies has not offered us any universal 
template for peaceful living, and it has not led us down any path of utopian existence. Rather, 
more so, it has further stratified our divisions and marginalized those not collusive with specific 
mainstream ideologies.  If there was not such a premium placed on certain types of knowledge 
[“cultural currency” is a term Aronowitz and Giroux use to highlight the value certain knowledge 
carries in the socio-political marketplace (56)], but an interest and enthusiasm for more forms of 
knowledge, then more groups—typically those whose voice and opinions were previously 
restricted—would be able to experience unprecedented worth and value.  
22
Postmodern Linguistics
When the post-structuralist movement first began in the 1960s, the field of Linguistics 
was shaken to its Saussurian foundations. Structuralist linguistics, which had long prevailed 
under the careful watch of modernist eyes, was completely turned on its head by Derridian 
“grammatology” and other post-structuralist claims.   Modernism’s “science” of language—one 
would have thought—had some serious issues to reevaluate and reconcile.  However, according 
to Robert Hodge, many of the most crucial aspects of post-structuralist (or postmodern) 
discourse have been completely disregarded by the discipline throughout the past 30 years, and 
today, “Linguistics still remains the official discipline for the study of language, because of the 
continuing authority of the modernist models of science it invokes” (242).  What he goes on to 
say is perhaps even more noteworthy:
But language itself is not the static object constructed by Linguistics.  As 
everyone outside Linguistics realises, language in use is dynamic, fluid, volatile, 
interconnected with all areas of life and thought, uninterested except in all its 
protean forms, embedded in all its situations of use.  The result is a crisis in 
Linguistics, and a problem for the study of language. (242)
This postmodern rhetorical stance—that language “in use” resists a standardized scientific 
study—has led Hodge to offer a solution to this outdated Linguistic model: what he calls a 
“postmodern science of language.”   In Hodge’s view “[Linguistics] has tried for most of the 
twentieth century to construct itself as a ‘science’, a scientific study of language opposed to 
humanist approaches” (241).  However, Hodge maintains some of these humanist approaches—
“literary studies and philosophy of language then, cultural studies and discourse analysis now” 
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(241)—are still quite valuable in discerning meaning from a language system.  And it is this void 
in the modern Linguistics discipline that has created room, as Hodge eloquently states, for 
a new framework for looking at language in all its forms, in all its connections, in 
search of a more viable form of Linguistics (comprehensive and illuminating 
about how language really is, usable for many purposes), nourished equally by 
ideas from science as the humanities.  It aims to be constructive, not destructive; 
respecting difference; elegant, open, powerful and inclusive.  (244)
What Hodge then does, and what could also be duplicated by English and Language Arts 
teachers, is offer several examples of the type of linguistic (or rhetorical) analysis he believes 
better embraces this idea of postmodern “uncertainty, unpredictability, ambiguity, and 
contradiction that characterise the phenomena of language” (241).  To do this, Hodge examines 
George Bush’s speech following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, through various 
systems: “the linguistic, the social, and the political, each interdependent, separate yet affecting 
and affected by the other two” (246).  What this allows him to do is arrive at a meaning that has 
taken much more into account than the few standard questions modernist Linguistics asks about 
the semantics of a specific phrase. Teachers might ask their students to view through a 
postmodern rhetorical lens certain texts, speeches, or even everyday phrases, which acknowledge 
a multiplicity of “systems,” until they begin to see the malleable nature of language.  A simple 
interrogative phrase, such as, “What time is it?” could be wrenched and evaluated from 
numerous angles (context, tone, volume, and countless others, right down to the gender, race, 
and age of the speaker) to highlight language’s protean makeup.  And if students can see the 
ways in which language is often inexact (“fuzzy” for Hodge) and contingent upon various 
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grounds, then they might also be able to see how language manufactures meaning and how that 
meaning might be something less than certain.      
Postmodern Grammar Lessons
While postmodern discourse can certainly help us in evaluating language and closer 
approximating its intended and unintended effects, the ability to legitimize language, especially 
the language of marginal cultures and discourses, remains perhaps its most beneficial aspect.  
The vast melting pot that is the United States is one nation that simply cannot afford to overlook 
the marked differences in its people and culture.  Yet when examining these problems, too often 
modernist rhetoric intrudes, and our differences are viewed as being in competition with another, 
moving linearly, “progressing” in a race towards an ultimate über-culture.  One area where this 
scenario has played out most evidently is in the school system, where efforts to teach grammar, 
or more specifically “Standard English” have been widely debated.  
The modernist hold on grammatical studies, I am contending, is responsible for more 
students being marginalized and deemed inferior than perhaps any other single discipline.  Under 
the rhetoric of modernism, minority students’ (namely African-Americans’) language (their 
speech, pronunciation, word choice, etc.) is often viewed as substandard.  However the rhetoric 
of postmodernism, which posits the arbitrariness of a power standard, can allow such students to 
see that their culturally-influenced linguistic and dialogic code, which does differ substantially 
from that of Standard English, is just as linguistically legitimate as far as a means of 
communicating and constructing one’s own identity and reality.  Where it remains illegitimate is 
in spaces that adopt modernist discourse’s presupposition that we have already arrived at a 
complete version of English, one that everyone should adhere to prescriptively and at all costs. 
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 As for postmodern discourse’s influence on our understanding of language, much of 
what has been uncovered has been slow to infiltrate primary educational levels.  Whereas at the 
university level there are certainly English, Linguistic, and even Sociology and Psychology 
courses which do acknowledge postmodern discourse and its focus on the dynamics of language, 
there still seems to be an insistence upon the modernist pedagogical method of the 
straightforward dissemination of Standard English to primary school aged children.  In this 
crucial stage of linguistic development, modernist discourse deprives students of specific 
knowledge about language (how it is weightless, at best an approximation, and loaded with 
meanings set in place by historical, cultural, and social exterior systems; and how despite this 
arbitrary nature it is able to remain functional) that would give them an important new 
perspective on the constructive power it wields in developing our identities. 
This modernist concentration on the standard forms has led to not only the ignoring of the 
diversity and richness of cultural dialects, inflections, word choice, and perhaps most fascinating, 
clarifying grammatical constructions, but also to a tacit subordination of these largely legitimate 
variations of the English language.  The socio-linguistic work of scholars , such as the work of 
William Labov, who has meticulously, and I dare say, “empirically” shown how the speech 
codes of African-American speakers follow specific grammatical rules just like that of standard 
English4, has, for the most part, largely been ignored when schools go about shaping their 
pedagogical mission.  
Some black educators, in an effort to combat this, have been able to fuse together, or 
“codeswitch” between, two versions of the English language.  Dr. Michael Eric Dyson, a 
prestigious educator at the University of Pennsylvania, has obviously been able to navigate the 
mainstream cultural-linguistic waters in order to gain his prominent position in academia, yet 
                                                
4 Labov’s groundbreaking, “The Logic of Non-Standard English,” (1969) offers several examples.
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what remains most interesting is that he has been able to do so at no loss to his African-American 
cultural linguistic heritage.  Listen to Dyson (a prolific author who regularly promotes his books 
on television spots) speak, and one cannot help but notice the various word choices and sentence 
structuring he implements.  Despite some of his choices obviously stemming from the lexicon of 
a minority culture—such as the phrases “dissed” or “hook-ups” (pars. 3, 14)—one would be 
outright wrong to suggest that Dr. Dyson sounded, “unintelligent” or “inferior.”  It is actions 
such as these (the fusion, or pastiche of various forms) that postmodern rhetoric encourages, 
which could be most beneficial to teachers who must decide how they are going to teach 
“English” to students from a variety of backgrounds.    
Here, I might be careful to acknowledge the stance of conservative and/or modernist 
rhetoric on the supposed benefits of grammatical correctness, yet what I am suggesting is not a 
total deconstruction or watering down of our national, standard version of English, I am just 
advocating that students should be taught the consequences (both good and bad) of not being in 
accord with such a version.  It is high time that educators stop seeing certain students’ inability to 
properly grasp the various aspects of Standard English as a failure, and more perhaps as an act 
either of defiance to hegemonic culture or compliance with one’s own historical, cultural legacy.  
Signithia Fordham and John Ogbu published their article, “Black Students’ School Success: 
Coping with the ‘Burden of Acting White,’” nearly 20 years ago concerning this very idea, yet 
few have taken notice of this important revelation.  Their theory suggested, “Academic 
achievement is not valued in the [African American] community because it is perceived as 
conforming to standard norms of success among white Americans […]  Moreover, it does not 
pay off for blacks like it does for others” (Tyson, Darity, and Castellino, 584).  If more educators 
were able to take these factors into account, then they might begin to construct a postmodern 
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rhetorical pedagogy that will allow minority students to gain entry into the standard-speaking 
matrix without the loss of any crucial part of their identity. 
POSTMODERN POLITICS?
The second discursive field that is still heavily influenced by modernist rhetoric and 
could perhaps most benefit from a postmodern reinvigoration is the field of public 
administration.  Since the Enlightenment’s social contract philosophers (Hobbes, Rousseau, and 
Locke) first laid the groundwork for Western democracy, political life in Western nations has 
been decidedly infused with modernist rhetoric.  This has continued up through our 
contemporary setting as many modernist rhetoricians still figure quite prominently in the 
political sphere.  Take for instance, the recent rhetorical positioning of two scholars, Francis 
Fukuyama and Robert Frank, who both continue to make misguided claims with scientific 
discourse at their defense.  
Fukuyama’s recent appearance on the CSPAN network’s “BookTV” offered an excellent 
example of this type of modernist rhetorical approach.  There promoting his new book America 
at the Crossroads, Fukuyama was having to constantly field questions posed by a live call-in 
audience concerning the war in Iraq.  Though he often had to defend his waffling position on the 
war itself, he still seemed to be discussing the matter, in the face of his admittedly incorrect 
assessment to go to war, with a resolute objective understanding.  He constantly referred to 
“empirical” evidence (no evidence really, only the word “empirical”) which he assured his 
listeners would ultimately reveal to us the proper way to deal with such volatile administrative 
situations as armed takeovers, nation-building, military occupation, insurgency, and the like.  
Again, situations like these, which involve the various dynamics of socially constructed 
ideologies, such as imperialism, nationalism, and xenophobia, in actuality have no objective 
answer, no “empirical” methodology able to take into consideration and accurately interpret all 
of these unanchored, constantly-in-flux factors.
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Another modernist rhetorician, Robert Frank, while not arguing about the politics of the 
Iraqi War, did take on another widely politicized subject in American life—the union of 
marriage.  Frank, an economist at Cornell University, recently published an article concerning 
the “economics” of polygamy in the New York Times.  His piece was an awkward attempt at 
rebutting the “conventional wisdom” that polygamy mostly harms women.  Frank certainly has 
his own reasons for wanting to disprove such a claim, which I won’t go into here, yet it is his 
method—the rhetoric he employs—that remains much more intriguing as it was, as one might 
have guessed, heavily modernist.  
Robert Frank, teeming with ethos provided by, among others, his position at a prominent 
university, attempts in this essay to answer questions about social engagement and interaction 
(more specifically relationships, love, and marriage) objectively and definitively with the 
modernist rhetoric of scientific certainty.  The two “sciences” he invokes are, not surprisingly, 
economics and, quite curiously, evolutionary Darwinism.  Because mathematical postulates and 
formulas are standard “empirical” data that generally accompany economic “laws,” modernists 
will often call upon the rhetoric of economics in order to defend a wide array of given points.  
No different here, as Frank suggests that legalizing polygamy “would create an imbalance of 
men over women among monogamist,” and thus, “with women in chronically short supply, men 
would face even more intense pressure than they do now to get ahead economically, to spend 
even longer hours honing their abs.”  He then concludes, “In short, the logic of supply and 
demand turns the conventional wisdom about plural marriage on its head. If the arrangement 
harms others, the most likely victims are men, not women.”   Frank’s glib assessment that “the 
logic of supply and demand” shows why men, not women, would suffer more is yet again, 
another classic example of modernist discourse deferring to empiricism.  Frank’s use of the word 
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“logic” is a clever rhetorical spin imparted to make anyone in disagreement seem illogical.  This 
reduction is so clever in fact that one might even miss Frank’s most glaring leap in “logic”—the 
very fact that he is using an economic model to predict the affairs of human beings.  This, 
however, is no matter for a skilled rhetorician like Frank who offers the most putative claim of 
all suggesting why he is able to make such a leap.  He insists, matter-of-factly, that “The law of 
supply and demand applies no less to social relationships than to ordinary commercial 
transactions.”  It does? And what, might I ask, is this based upon? Where is the “empirical” 
evidence that suggests this?  Yet he offers no such indication.  
Frank’s second bit of rhetorical maneuvering occurs when he again yields to scientific 
rhetoric, or specifically, evolutionary Darwinism.  Midway through his article Frank chooses to 
include a story about the mating habits of another “polygamous” species—bull elephant seals.  
The anecdote is meant to show how the polygamous nature of seals drives males into extreme 
competition, where they must battle for the rights to “harems” of up to 50 female seals.  Because 
Frank’s “survival of the fittest” assessment is “scientific,” “logical,” and has been “reasoned” 
thoroughly with the aid of “empirical” evidence, many of his readers will defer to such “facts” 
and disregard the very “fact” that Frank is comparing men and women to 6,000 and 1,500 pound 
bull elephant seals.  
The rhetorical concept of scotosis might lend an explanation as to why such a deference 
to empiricism occurs so often in modernist rhetoric.  Scotosis, according to Paula Mathieu, 
are rationalized acts of selective blindness that occur by allowing certain 
information to be discounted or unexamined[.] Scotosis is a term that can help 
explain more fully the rhetorical process of interpellation[.] One isn’t duped, nor 
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are false needs created.  Rather, one is persuaded by the justifications offered 
within the narratives to remain […] within its parameters. (114-115)  
It is this blindness, produced by a rhetoric that claims the authority of scientific experimentation, 
“empiricism,” is the be all and end all that must be overturned.  And postmodern discourse, 
which accounts for multiplicity and urges we examine all aspects, could certainly work towards 
eliminating such blinding measures. 
Taking this idea further, one postmodern rhetorician, Hugh Miller, suggests one remain 
quite suspicious any time the term “empirical” is uttered.  He avers,
Empiricism [itself] is a metanarrative, [yet one] that insists it is not a 
metanarrative, a politics that insists it is apolitical.  Instead, empiricism perseveres 
in maintaining that its symbolizations provide a denotative link between language 
and reality; that it is capable, in a neutral manner, of capturing real things external 
to its symbolizations. (471)  
This production of modernist rhetoric, that empiricism can accurately capture “real things” may 
be true in certain instances (certain instances that do not necessarily involve social 
circumstances) and may also be the impetus behind empiricism’s solidification.  Alan Sokal’s 
classic remark, which invites any antifoundationalist to denounce objectivity by stepping off the 
balcony of his 21st floor apartment, comes to mind as an obvious example of what empiricism 
has been able to gain (“Afterword” 97).  Yet what this reduction fails to do is distinguish 
between the physics of a body falling in motion and a body reacting socially to a perceived social 
circumstance.  The point that seems to have been missed is that a reliance on science-based 
empiricism in all instances, regularly leads to narrow, unchallenged dogmatic approaches that 
result in disaster (see the quagmire in Iraq).  Miller understands that empiricism can genuinely 
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lead us to valuable assumptions, and even “heartily endorse[s] the strategic use of empirical 
facts” “on pragmatic grounds” (472).  However, Miller offers the caveat that “an unyielding 
commitment to the empirical, as if it were some final arbiter of performance, accountability, or 
results leads to numerous practical problems in public administration” (472).
Not having an empirical basis for our sociological behavior should not, however, be a 
cause for concern.  Just because postmodern discourse suggests we are unable to provide an 
objective answer to such difficult social dilemmas, by no means does it suggest we stop trying.  
What we should do, and what a postmodern Weltanschauung would allow, with its insistence 
upon constant reevaluation and skeptical humility, is to formulate numerous possibilities, 
cornucopias of methods to enact, in a sort of “guess and check” method at more local levels.  
What we do not need is a cabal of Randist neo-con intellectuals, who are so cocksure (to borrow 
a phrase from Bertrand Russell) of their “reasoned” approach, producing a discourse that allows 
no room for other ideas.  
What seems to be ironic is that despite modernist rhetoric’s constant calls for 
accountability, Fukuyama and other Randist rhetoricians often dismiss their erroneous judgments 
and consistently push the same narrow agenda.  This narrow agenda of “capitalism at all costs” 
appears to them to be air tight when supported by their “reasoned” methodology of the “science” 
of economics.  However, the straw man rears his head when we begin to question the ability of 
reason and science to provide us with, as I have discussed, empirical evidence not for economic 
issues, but for social, cultural, and political phenomena.  After all, the Ayn Rand objectivist 
credo is “the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of 
his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute” 
(aynrand.org).  Yet, as I have shown repeatedly, where science may prove itself to be empirical 
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in certain closed situations like that which occurs in the fields of mathematics, physics, 
chemistry, and perhaps even economics, it is whenever we have tried to pinpoint a scientific 
basis for our sociological and psychological functions that we have miserably failed (the 
outdated practice of Freudian psychotherapy comes to mind).  
The perpetuation of the modernist rhetoric of “reasoned objectivity,” especially in the 
political and public administration arenas, has continuously led to problems.  Michael Spicer 
maintains that because certain postmodern conditions have come to exist within our 
contemporary political setting (i.e. our acknowledgement of a multiplicity of social and political 
narratives), then our public officials must have at their disposal the rhetoric of postmodern 
discourse—namely that of “value pluralism” (a term he uses to designate this postmodern 
understanding of multiplicity and diversity)—when evaluating problems in public policy (679).  
The main reason why Spicer feels public administrators and policy-makers should be 
aware of such postmodern rhetorical methods equipped in dealing with plurality is, quite simply, 
because they so often find themselves in positions where a multiplicity of values and ideologies 
must be held.  According to Hendrick Wagenaar, whom Spicer quotes, “public programs are 
structured in such a way that they regularly confront the administrator with difficult choices, 
[and] resolving value conflict is an intrinsic part of administrative life” (qtd. in Spicer 679).  
However, this issue of holding and resolving irreconcilable ideas is something Spicer feels a 
postmodern approach might be able to aid.  He argues that while recent political and social 
sciences have acknowledged the discrepancies and incongruities that often arise in issues of 
public policy, they have failed to produce any model that would allow for reconciliation, noting 
that “the record of the social sciences in contributing to public administration and policy is 
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simply not that impressive” (685).  Because of this unimpressive track record, Spicer goes on to 
suggest that a newer, postmodern rhetoric is needed in our postmodern environment.  
Before furthering this argument, Spicer first acknowledges why some policy makers may 
still prefer such an outdated modernist approach (what he refers to as a “science-based 
instrumental rationalism”) in evaluating public policy and administration issues.  The passage 
addressing this is worth quoting at some length:
The appeal of this type of science based instrumental rationalism is quite 
understandable in that, at least on the surface, it appears to provide us with a way 
in which the findings of empirical social science can be harnessed to meet the 
practical day-to-day decision-making needs of public managers and policy 
makers. (678)
He then suggests why this is incorrect:
However, value pluralism in public administration may be seen as limiting the 
usefulness of precisely this type of instrumental rationalist approach.  This is 
because, for such an approach to be helpful to administrators or policy-makers in 
making choices among different courses of action or different institutional 
designs, then the ends or values that are sought by them must ultimately be either 
compatible or commensurable with each other.  Should these ends, in fact, turn 
out to be incompatible and incommensurable with one another, then, an 
instrumental rationalist approach simply cannot provide administrators with any 
guidance in choosing among them. (678)
It is important to note that while Spicer maintains “science-based instrumental rationalism” is 
unable to resolve differences in values that may arise, so too may be the “value-pluralist” 
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approach postmodernism offers.  However, it is not the job of either to arbitrate these 
incommensurabilities so much as it is their task to acknowledge and accept the conditions in 
which such a plurality of ideas come to exist.  
Spicer suggests one of the conditions that perhaps allows these pluralities to subsist is the 
existence of numerous value systems or moral/ethical standards that often bear upon the ideas 
and values we choose among.  And it is these value systems, themselves, which must also be 
fully wrenched and closely examined.  Spicer argues, “Given that public administrators must 
make decisions that involve incompatible and incommensurable values or ends and that 
interpretations of facts are inevitably shaped by those values, then public administration enquiry 
needs to encourage a greater awareness of the values that it expresses in its own discourse” 
(684).  And according to him, there is one reasonable way this can be accomplished, and that is 
by “consulting political philosophy [so as to understand] the values that are intimated in the 
administrative ideas, which we espouse, and also the administrative practices, which we follow” 
(685).  Or in other words, he is suggesting we move beyond the modernist approach of centuries 
past and evaluate problems in the postmodern era, with the tools of postmodern discourse.  
Though this may seem like an impotent suggestion to some, it is one that could do no worse than 
the efforts of “social science [that have failed] to produce ‘anything approximating law-like 
generalizations which would apply to major issues as policy formulation, decision making, and 
strategy’” (Mitchell and Scott, qtd. in Spicer 685).
Proponents of postmodern discourse in the political and public administration realms 
must understand that when we enter this complex social matrix, all bets are off.  Meaning that 
the various social, cultural, and political institutions which shape our lives are far too complex: 
they often shift and overlap and defy any objective, comprehensive understanding.  There can 
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only be a continual striving towards finding a more suitable framework for evaluating our social 
actions and implementing our social agendas through, perhaps “reasonable” inquiry, yet only if it 
remains fashioned with a postmodern awareness of uncertainty.  And the more ideas created (as 
postmodern rhetoric would certainly allow for) the more voices included, the more “accurate” 
the framework will be.  It should be of little concern that in matters directly related to our social 
behavior, no discourse will be able to determine the best mode of production for a nation, the 
best way for a nation to distribute its wealth, or the best way for a nation to educate its public.  
What a postmodern discourse might do, however, especially in the field of public administration, 
by insisting on constant interrogation of systems and institutions, instead of adhering to the stale 
methods modernism offers, is discover a more suitable approach that takes into account the 
multiplicity of voices involved. 
CONCLUSION
The rhetoric of modernism, in its many forms, has survived often unimpeded for several 
centuries.   And this lengthy stay might very well lead one to believe that modernist discourse 
will continue for centuries to come.  However, the sweeping changes in our global economic, 
scientific, and technological communities, which have occurred in the past 30 years, must also 
reconfigure how we understand and comprehend the very complex world around us.  This 
change, however slow and erosive, does seem to be taking place somewhat with the increasing 
awareness of postmodern discourse.  As Harold Bloland states, 
Newspapers and magazines, in chronicling abrupt changes in our lifestyles and 
life circumstances, report almost casually that we are already citizens in a 
postmodern world.  Postmodernity has become a catchall referent to the rapid 
bizarre changes associated with the recognition of America’s new, more 
precarious position in the world and of the changed conditions in which we live.  
Many terms associated with postmodernism have entered the mainstream 
vocabularies of popular culture, media descriptions of news events, technological 
innovations, and entertainment. (126)
Yet this is still not enough.  Such dilettantish usage of the highly complex term postmodernism
simply will not do; postmodernism needs to be understood and comprehended in much more 
specified and useful ways.  And one way postmodern discourse might be able to most accurately
enter the ideology of contemporary Western societies is through its use in the two fields I have 
suggested, education and public administration.  It is these two areas—which greatly influence 
and shape our ideas of what it means to be a productive, thoughtful American citizen—where 
modernist rhetoric seems to be most rampant.  By implementing postmodern rhetorical strategies 
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in the classroom, which pay closer attention to knowledge multiplicity and even more 
specifically language (how it is inexact, loaded with circumstantial meanings, and yet despite 
this, how great an impact it has on shaping our identities), students might be able to actively 
construct their own narratives—narratives that better account for the variety and diversity of the 
world around us.  And also, if politicians, policy makers, and public administrators can use these 
same tools of postmodern rhetoric in the political arena, then the decisions they make would 
certainly be more informed.  
In order to shake this rather incorrect assumption that postmodern discourse is recondite, 
unusable, or useless, the rhetoric of postmodernism must not only infiltrate more areas, but it 
also must offer accurate, meaningful descriptions, not shamefully pejorative definitions, of what 
is meant by the idea postmodern.  Modernists need not grumble, shake their heads, and mutter 
“Oh no!” at the mentioning of postmodernism.  Rather postmodern rhetoric needs to be 
embraced, saluted perhaps, for it has much to offer to its modernist progenitor.  And this offering 
is most crucial now in the 21st century, as we continue to condense and bring together the world 
and its widely different people and cultures.  
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